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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
POLLAK, District Judge: 
 
This appeal concerns a $500,000 life insurance contract 
("the policy") between appellee, The Guardian Life 
Insurance Company of America ("Guardian"), and Kevin H. 
Moore, the deceased husband of appellant, Donna M. 
Goduti-Moore. Guardian, a New York corporation, brought 
this diversity action against Ms. Goduti-Moore, a citizen of 
New Jersey, in New Jersey's federal district court seeking a 
declaratory judgment respecting the parties' rights and 
obligations under the policy. In particular, Guardian sought 
to determine whether the policy had lapsed on the day 
before Mr. Moore's death. The District Court granted 
Guardian's motion for summary judgment, holding that the 
policy had so lapsed, and we review that determination de 
novo. 
 
Facts 
 
The policy was signed by Guardian and Mr. Moore on 
October 4, 1994, with Ms. Goduti-Moore as its primary 
beneficiary. The policy's basic terms specified, inter alia: 
that premiums could be paid either yearly or by some 
mutually-accepted fraction of a year, that such payments 
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had to be made prior to the applicable coverage period, and 
that each payment's "due date" would be followed by a 
thirty-one-day "grace period." As discussed infra, this 
appeal essentially turns on how the policy's due date and 
grace period provisions should be interpreted and applied. 
 
When the policy was issued and delivered, Mr. Moore and 
Guardian agreed to change the frequency of payment from 
an annual schedule to a monthly one, and Mr. Moore opted 
for a "Guard-o-Matic Premium Arrangement," by which 
premiums were to be drawn automatically from his 
checking account with Growth Bank. Pursuant to this 
Guard-o-Matic Premium Arrangement, Guardian made Mr. 
Moore aware that, although the policy specified payments 
as due on the fourth of each month, all Guard-o-Matic 
clients' payments were, as a practical matter, withdrawn on 
or about the fifteenth. Consistently with this practice, 
Guardian deducted premium payments from Mr. Moore's 
designated account each month from January 16, 1995 1 
until July 15, 1996. On July 30, 1996, however, Mr. Moore 
closed his checking account with Growth Bank, and he did 
not arrange for the Guardian premiums to be paid from any 
other source. Consequently, on August 15, Guardian's draft 
demanding that month's premium was returned unpaid. 
 
On August 21, Guardian notified Mr. Moore that he was 
being removed from the Guard-o-Matic program and that 
his method of payment was to be "changed to regular 
billing." Among other information, the notice contained the 
following description of Mr. Moore's payment obligations: 
 
       Premium Due 08/04/96  113.50 
       Premium Due 09/04/96  113.50 
       Amount Due           $267.00 
 
Mr. Moore never paid his August insurance premium, and 
he died on September 5, 1996. 
 
Discussion 
 
Appellee asserts, and the District Court held, that Mr. 
Moore died one day too late to collect benefits from the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Mr. Moore apparently paid his first three premiums--for October, 
November, and December of 1994--by a check dated October 31, 1994. 
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Guardian life insurance policy. Under this approach, Mr. 
Moore's due date for August of 1996 was, per the policy's 
terms, August 4; the grace period commenced the next day, 
on August 5; and the grace period expired thirty-one days 
after the due date, on September 4, causing Mr. Moore's 
policy to lapse and his coverage to cease. See generally 
Appellant App. at 89 ("If the premium is not paid by the 
end of the grace period, the policy lapses as of the date of 
default. Upon lapse, the policy has no value."). 
 
On the other hand, Ms. Goduti-Moore offers three 
reasons that the policy had not lapsed as of September 5. 
First, Ms. Goduti-Moore claims that, since the August 4 due 
date fell on a Sunday, certain state laws regulating 
contractual interpretation required that the due date be 
moved to Monday, August 5. Pursuant to this analysis, the 
grace period began on August 6, and Mr. Moore's death, on 
September 5, occurred during the grace period's last day. 
Second, Ms. Goduti-Moore argues that Guardian's notice of 
August 21, which described Mr. Moore's payment 
obligations, was ambiguous. The notice prescribed $113.50 
as due on August 4, 1996; $113.50 as due on September 
4, 1996; and an apparently total "Amount Due" of $267, for 
which no due date was articulated. Ms. Goduti-Moore 
claims that the August 21 notice could reasonably have 
meant that Mr. Moore's August premium was, as part of 
the undated "Amount Due," due on the later date contained 
in the notice, September 4, rather than on the earlier date, 
August 4. Thus, Ms. Goduti-Moore claims that the policy's 
thirty-one-day grace period expired on October 5. Third, Ms. 
Goduti-Moore argues that, by its practice of making 
automatic withdrawals on the fifteenth of each month, 
Guardian waived its right, provided by the terms of the 
contract, to demand payment on the fourth of the month. 
Hence, Ms. Goduti-Moore asserts that the policy's due date 
was August 15, and the grace period expired on September 
15. 
 
For the reasons given in the subsequent portions of this 
opinion, we agree with Ms. Goduti-Moore's first argument: 
Interpreting the contract's grace period in favor of the 
insured, and applying New York's statute regulating 
contracts with Sunday due dates, we conclude that Mr. 
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Moore's premium was due on Monday, August 5. Thus, the 
thirty-one-day policy's grace period provision began on 
August 6, and that period did not expire prior to Mr. 
Moore's death on September 5. Since this analysis decides 
the appeal in Ms. Goduti-Moore's favor, we think it 
unnecessary to consider her other arguments. 
 
Premiums Payable on Sunday 
 
Since this diversity case involves the application of state 
statutory provisions regulating contractual interpretation, a 
natural starting point would be to determine which state's 
substantive law applied: New York's or New Jersey's. 
However, the District Court found it unnecessary to resolve 
the choice-of-law question; instead, it found a false conflict 
because the substantive law of New Jersey and the 
substantive law of New York seemed to the court to be 
materially indistinguishable. See Dist. Ct. Op. at 8. 
 
Neither party disagreed with the District Court's 
disposition of the choice-of-law question; moreover, in the 
presentation of this appeal, each of the parties has 
expressed the belief that the substantive law of New York 
(Guardian's place of business and state of incorporation; 
the place of negotiation and execution of the insurance 
contract; and the place of payment of premiums) and the 
substantive law of New Jersey (the decedent's domiciliary 
state) would both yield the same result.2  
 
Since the parties are satisfied with the District Court's 
determination that the applicable substantive law of New 
York and the applicable substantive law of New Jersey are 
equivalent, we will not go behind that consensus. To the 
contrary, we will assume--arguendo--that the parties' 
consensus is soundly based. Since the New York statute 
relating to the construction of contracts whose due dates 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. At oral argument, Ms. Goduti-Moore's counsel, Mr. Belsole, stated, 
"The policy couldn't have lapsed on the 4th of August `96 because both 
New York and New Jersey law have a provision--a statutory provision-- 
that when a Sunday is a date of payment you go to Monday." And to this 
court's question, "I gather that you're in agreement with Mr. Belsole and, 
as I understand it, with the District Court, that this case will be 
decided 
the same way whether it's a matter of New York or New Jersey law?", 
Guardian's counsel replied, "Yes, I am." 
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fall on weekends and holidays3 is, textually, more fleshed 
out than the New Jersey statute dealing with a portion of 
that subject matter,4 we will conduct our analysis within 
the framework of the New York statute.5  
 
Of the two New York statutes that regulate due dates 
falling on Sundays, the first is General Construction Law 
S 25, which governs the interpretation of private contracts: 
 
       S 25. Public holiday, Saturday or Sunday, in 
       contractual obligation; extension of time where 
       performance of act authorized or required on Saturday, 
       Sunday, or public holiday. 
 
       Where a contract by its terms authorizes or requires 
       the payment of money or the performance of a 
       condition on a Saturday, Sunday, or public holiday, or 
       authorizes or requires a payment of money or the 
       performance of a condition within or before or after a 
       period of time computed from a certain day, and such 
       period of time ends on a Saturday, Sunday, or public 
       holiday, unless the contract expressly or implicitly 
       indicates a different intent, such payment may be 
       made or condition performed on the next succeeding 
       business day . . . with the same force and effect as if 
       made or performed in accordance with the terms of the 
       contract. 
 
N.Y. Gen. Constr. Law S 25 (McKinney 1999) (hereinafter 
"S 25"). The second is General Construction Law S 25-a, 
which concerns public statutes and regulations: 
 
       S 25-a. Public holiday, Saturday or Sunday in statutes; 
       extension of time where performance of act is due on 
       Saturday, Sunday or public holiday 
 
       1. When any period of time, computed from a certain 
       day, within which or after which or before which an act 
       is authorized or required to be done, ends on a 
       Saturday, Sunday or a public holiday, such act may be 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. N.Y. Gen. Constr. Law S 25 (McKinney 1999). 
 
4. N.J. Stat. Ann. 36:1-1 (1999). 
 
5. Within their appellate briefs and oral arguments, the litigants have 
focused attention almost exclusively on the application of New York law. 
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       done on the next succeeding business day . . . except 
       that where a period of time specified by contract ends 
       on a Saturday, Sunday or a public holiday, the 
       extension of such period is governed by section twenty- 
       five of this chapter. 
 
N.Y. Gen. Constr. Law S 25-a (McKinney 1999) (hereinafter 
"S 25-a"). 
 
In briefing this appeal, Goduti-Moore has relied on S 25- 
a. The opening words of the caption of S 25 -"Public 
holiday, Saturday or Sunday, in contractual obligation" - 
strongly imply that S 25 has greater pertinence to the 
private contractual dispute presented in the case at bar 
than S 25-a, the opening words of whose caption are "Public 
holiday, Saturday or Sunday in statutes." This implication 
is markedly enhanced by the fact that S 25-a expressly 
defers to S 25 when a contract is involved. 6 At oral 
argument, Guardian attempted to justify its focus onS 25- 
a by contending that S 25-a and S 25 are equivalent. But 
appellee's argument on this point seems incomplete for two 
reasons. First, the text of S 25 is broader than S 25-a in 
potentially relevant ways. Section 25 has two clauses: one, 
which deals with specified dates that fall on Sundays, and 
another, which concerns periods of time that end on 
Sundays. See supra. The terms of S 25-a, however, only 
include the latter of these clauses, which regulates time 
periods ending on Sunday; S 25-a does not appear to govern 
specified dates that fall on Sundays. Thus, even if S 25 and 
S 25-a were parallel with respect to periods of time, S 25-a 
has little direct relevance to the issue presented here, 
namely, treatment of a particular "due date" that falls on 
Sunday. 
 
Second, although S 25 and S 25-a were passed 
simultaneously and have similar general purposes, their 
different legal contexts -- one regulating private contracts 
and the other regulating public statutes -- implicate 
different norms and consequences, which further support 
reading S 25 more broadly than S 25-a. For example, 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. "[W]here a period of time specified by contract ends on a Saturday, 
Sunday or a public holiday, the extension of such a period is governed 
by section twenty-five of this chapter." 
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Burgess v. Long Island Railroad Authority, 587 N.E.2d 269 
(N.Y. 1991) -- a S 25-a case on which Guardian relies -- 
concerned a statutory "stay" applied to the limitations 
period in suits against New York public authorities. Under 
New York law, plaintiffs suing such authorities were 
required to allege that the defendant had not acted on their 
grievance despite thirty days' notice thereof. According to a 
separate statute, this thirty-day notice period was excluded 
from the one year limitations period, operationally allowing 
plaintiffs one year and thirty days to commence their suit. 
In his case, Mr. Burgess claimed that the stay should be 
extended by three days beyond this year and thirty days, 
since his injury occurred on Friday evening, after the Long 
Island Railroad Authority had closed for the weekend. 
Thus, he was unable to file his grievance immediately after 
his injury occurred. Notwithstanding the fact that his suit 
accrued on Friday, Mr. Burgess asserted that his 
limitations period, including the thirty-day stay, should 
have begun on Monday, and he should have been allowed 
to file his lawsuit within a year and thirty-three days of his 
injury. 
 
The New York Court of Appeals rejected Mr. Burgess's 
argument, inter alia, out of respect for "the interests of 
uniformity" that arise in applying statutes of limitations to 
varied administrative contexts. Id. (disapproving any rule 
"whereby the time in which to commence an action against 
a public authority would vary case to case"). Because 
public regulations tend to regulate broad categories of 
actors and activities, providing a uniform standard was one 
apparent impetus for the Burgess court's interpretation of 
S 25-a. With respect to S 25, however, the affected contracts 
govern the actions of particular parties, who sign and have 
access to the particular details of said contracts. Thus, the 
interests in administrative uniformity and in respecting 
general public expectations, which seemed to concern the 
court in Burgess, appear substantially reduced in the 
context of S 25. Based on the two statutes' distinct 
language and their different legal contexts, we conclude 
that S 25 and S 25-a are not equivalent. Thus, the New York 
statute applicable to the present controversy isS 25, which 
regulates private contracts. 
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As quoted more fully supra, S 25 provides that "[w]here a 
contract by its terms authorizes or requires the payment of 
money . . . on . . . Sunday, . . . unless the contract 
expressly or implicitly indicates a different intent, such 
payment may be made . . . on the next succeeding business 
day." N.Y. Gen. Constr. Law S 25. Thus, the vital legal 
question is whether the terms of Guardian's insurance 
policy could, when read in the light most favorable to Mr. 
Moore, as the insured, reasonably be construed as either 
"authoriz[ing]" or "requir[ing]" the payment of money on 
Sunday, August 4th, for purposes of S 25. 
 
The relevant portions of Guardian's policy read as 
follows: 
 
       Premium Payment 
 
       All premiums, including the first, are payable in 
       advance. After the first premium, premiums are 
       payable annually . . . . Premiums may be paid . . . 
       [semi-annually, quarterly, or] in any other manner 
       acceptable to Guardian. . . . [A] change [in payment 
       frequency] must result in a premium falling due on 
       each policy anniversary. 
 
       Due Date and Default 
 
       The premium due date is the date on which the 
       premium is payable. Any premium that is not paid on 
       its due date is in default; this due date is the date of 
       default. 
 
       Grace Period 
 
       Guardian allows a grace period of 31 days after the due 
       date for premium payments. 
 
Appellants App. at 89. 
 
In construing S 25, New York's courts apparently have 
not yet considered a case such as this, where an insurance 
contract's due date is followed by a grace period. 7 Our 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. Guardian asserts that "New York decisions dealing with [S 25-a] clearly 
reject [appellant's] argument." However, cases analyzing S 25-a are not 
overly helpful with respect to the present appeal, which concerns a 
portion of S 25 that is not contained in S 25-a. Moreover, even if cases 
concerning S 25-a were legally pertinent, the three decisions cited by 
Guardian have materially distinct facts from the case at bar: 
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analysis of this issue of first impression proceeds in two 
steps. First, we hold that the policy's ambiguous language 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
Desmond-Americana v. Jorling, 153 A.D.2d 4 (N.Y. App. Div. 1989), 
applied S 25-a to New York's Administrative Procedure Act. The latter 
statute requires agencies to adopt proposed rules within 180 days of the 
last public hearing held, unless a continuation notice is filed before 
that 
time. An agency may file a maximum of two such notices, each of which 
would add 90 days to the original 180-day period. In Desmond- 
Americana, the Department of Environmental Conservation held its last 
hearing on November 9, 1987; two timely continuation notices were filed, 
which extended the adoption period through Thursday, November 3, 
1988; but the agency did not file its notice of adoption until Friday, 
November 4. The agency asserted that its notice was not untimely filed 
because the original 180-day adoption period had ended on Saturday, 
May 7, 1988. The agency argued that, since, underS 25-a, it could 
(counterfactually) have filed its continuation notice on Monday, May 9, 
two extra days should be added to the final adoption deadline of 
November 3. The Desmond-Americana court agreed that S 25-a would 
have allowed a timely extension notice on Monday, May 9. But the court 
held that, under the Administrative Procedure Act, the effect of a 
hypothetical extension filed on that date would only have been to add 90 
days to the 180-day period measured from the last public hearing. Thus, 
although the agency could have filed its continuation notice on Monday 
without penalty, the total number of days added by such filing, for 
purposes of the Administrative Procedure Act, would not have changed; 
the agency's notice of adoption still was required within 360 days of the 
last public hearing. 
 
Abrams v. Design Works, Inc., 198 A.D.2d 252 (N.Y. App. Div. 1993), 
applied S 25-a to N.Y. C.P.L.R. 214(5), which provides a three-year 
statute of limitations for personal injury suits, and to N.Y. C.P.L.R. 
203(b)(5), which allows a 60-day extension if a summons is delivered to 
the sheriff. In Abrams, the plaintiff 's action accrued on March 3, 1987; 
he forwarded the summons and complaint to the sheriff on February 28, 
1990, which extended the limitations period until Wednesday, May 2, 
1990; but the corporate defendant was not served until Friday, May 4, 
1990. Mr. Abrams argued that, since the initial three-year limitations 
period ended on Saturday, March 3, 1990, two days should be added to 
the end of the extension period. The Abrams court disagreed, holding 
that the effect of the statutory extension, which added sixty days to the 
ordinary three-year limitations period, was unchanged by the fact that 
the last day for obtaining such an extension fell on Saturday. The 
extension statute did not grant sixty days from the time said extension 
was filed; rather, it granted an extra sixty days from the date of 
accrual. 
Thus, regardless of S 25-a, the maximum total time available to Mr. 
Abrams, under N.Y. C.P.L.R. 203 and 214(5), was three years and sixty 
days from March 3, 1987. 
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defining the term "due date" could reasonably be construed 
as "authoriz[ing]" or as "requir[ing]" payment on Sunday, 
August 4; either interpretation would suffice to justify 
applying S 25 to the policy's due date. Second, we hold that, 
by virtue of S 25, Mr. Moore could have paid his insurance 
premium on August 5 without being in default; therefore, 
the due date (per the contractual provisions quoted supra) 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
Burgess v. Long Island Railroad Authority, 587 N.E.2d at 269, applied 
S 25-a to Pub. Auth. 1276(1) and (2), which provide a one-year 
limitations period for suits against public authorities and which require 
that grievances be presented directly to such authorities for thirty days 
before a lawsuit may be filed, and to N.Y. C.P.L.R. 204(a), which excludes 
this thirty-day "stay" from limitations period calculations. The Burgess 
plaintiff was allegedly injured on the tracks of the Long Island Railroad 
on Friday, September 2, 1988, after business hours. He did not serve the 
defendant with a summons and complaint until Tuesday, October 3, 
1989, which was one year and thirty-one days after his accident. The 
plaintiff claimed that his limitations period should be extended by three 
days because he could not have presented his grievance to the 
defendant, for purposes of Pub. Auth. 1276(2), until Monday, September 
5, 1988. The court rejected Mr. Burgess's argument because he had not 
been required, under any statute, to present his grievance to the agency 
on the very day of his accident. On the contrary, Mr. Burgess could have 
satisfied Pub. Auth. 1276(2) by presenting his grievance to the authority 
on any day within the statutorily allotted year. Thus, the court 
interpreted N.Y. C.P.L.R. 204(a)'s "stay" as merely having extended the 
ordinary one-year limitations period to one year and thirty days; and the 
court held that this extended period, measured from the accrual date, 
should have the same total duration, regardless of whether the action 
accrued on a Saturday. 
 
Each of the above cases involves a procedure for extending a statutory 
period of time, pursuant to which the lengthened period is measured by 
the event marking the original period's beginning. Thus, the fact that 
S 25-a grants such plaintiffs an "extra" day to seek their extension does 
not affect the date of the final, extended deadline; for, whether an 
extension were obtained with or without the aid ofS 25-a, the total 
duration allotted was simply the sum of the original period and the 
extension. In contrast, the grace period in Ms. Goduti-Moore's case is 
explicitly measured by the due date, i.e., the end of the standard 
payment period. Therefore, if S 25 granted Mr. Moore one additional day 
to pay his premium before going into default, that"extra" day would 
delay both the date on which the grace period began and the date on 
which the policy would have lapsed. 
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also could be reasonably construed as August 5. Since the 
grace period began the day after the due date, i.e., on 
August 6, Mr. Moore's death on September 5 occurred 
during the last day he was entitled to benefits under the 
policy. 
 
A. Mr. Moore's Payment Was "[A]uthorize[d]" on Sunday 
 
As the District Court correctly noted, the above-quoted 
terms of the policy are not ambiguous with respect to the 
numerical date they purport to specify. In Mr. Moore's case, 
the "policy anniversary" was October 4, and he had 
arranged for a monthly payment schedule; thus, premium 
payments would ordinarily be due on the fourth of any 
given month. Pursuant to S 25, however, if the terms of Mr. 
Moore's policy "authorize[d]" payment of money on a 
Sunday, that payment could be made on the succeeding 
business day "with the same force and effect," unless the 
contract indicated some specific, contrary intent. 8 
 
We find that Guardian's policy is at least ambiguous as 
to whether the term "due date," as the "date on which the 
premium is payable," can be read as "authoriz[ing]" a 
premium payment on August 4 sufficiently for purposes of 
S 25. It might be argued on Guardian's behalf that the 
policy "authorize[d]" premium payments during the grace 
period, but not on the due date itself. Support for such an 
interpretation might arise from Guardian's practice, per the 
Guard-o-matic Premium Arrangement, of drawing payments 
on the fifteenth of each month, even though such 
withdrawals would occur during the policy grace period 
with respect to almost all of Guardian's clients. 9 Under this 
interpretation, the "due date," despite its apparently 
exhortative title, would be construed as a pure formality, 
which marks the beginning of the grace period, but which 
is not a date of any substantive significance in terms of 
"authoriz[ing]" payments. Thus, S 25 would not have 
applied to the policy's due date provision; the premium 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. Guardian has not argued that such contrary intent is indicated here. 
Indeed, Mr. Moore's policy does not appear to have contemplated issues 
surrounding Sunday due dates at all. 
 
9. The exception being any Guardian clients whose"policy anniversary" 
happens to fall on the fifteenth. 
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would have remained due on August 4, per the policy's 
explicit terms; and the thirty-one-day grace period would 
have commenced on August 5 and terminated on 
September 4. 
 
But the language and operation of Guardian's policy also 
admits of another reasonable interpretation, pursuant to 
which the due date provision did "authorize[ ]" payment for 
purposes of S 25. The policy's definition of due date as the 
"date on which the premium is payable" seems explicitly to 
contemplate premiums' payment as being permitted and 
appropriate on that day. Indeed, it is difficult to understand 
a "date" on which when premiums are "payable" might be, 
if it were not a date on which such payments were 
"authorize[d]." 
 
The idea that premium payments were authorized on the 
policy's due date finds further support in the policy's 
requirement that payments must be rendered on the due 
date if an insured wishes to avoid default. Guardian 
suggests that the above interpretation of the policy's due 
date is inconsistent with the policy's grace period provision, 
which protects from financial burden any insureds who pay 
premiums after the due date, provided that such payments 
are made within thirty-one days. But it does not seem 
unreasonable, much less illogical, to suggest that both the 
due date and the grace period serve to "authorize[ ]" 
premium payments. Thus, interpreting the terms of the 
contract in favor of the insured, we conclude that the 
language and structure of the policy show that Guardian's 
insurance contract could reasonably be interpreted as 
"authoriz[ing]" payment on Sunday, August 4. And that fact 
alone is sufficient to bring the policy's due date provision 
within the scope of S 25. 
 
B. Mr. Moore's Premium Payment Was "[R]equire[d]" on 
       Sunday 
 
Parallel logic suggests that the policy also could be 
construed as "requir[ing]" payment on August 4 for 
purposes of S 25. By its terms, the "date on which 
premiums are payable" seems to "require[ ]" payment on the 
designated due date, and so does the contractual 
declaration that those who do not pay on that date are in 
"default." 
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In response, it could be argued, on Guardian's behalf, 
that Mr. Moore's payment was not actually "require[d]" on 
August 4, since no financial penalty for non-payment could 
be imposed until after the grace period had expired. The 
interesting issue of statutory construction, however, is 
whether any such financial penalty is necessary for a due 
date to "require[ ] payment" underS 25. For two reasons, we 
hold that it is not. First, by placing the word"require" and 
"authorize" together, and by focusing on what a contract 
prescribes "by its terms," the statutory text suggests that 
any explicit, formal designation of a "require[d]" payment-- 
such as the designation in Mr. Moore's policy--is properly 
within the province of S 25. 
 
Second, a contrary interpretation of S 25, which would 
define the term "requires" as necessarily including a 
financial penalty of some kind, would demand that courts 
decide what form of penalty would be sufficient. One 
possible interpretation following this approach would hold 
that only a "substantial" penalty, relative to the total value 
of the contract, could truly "require" payment on a certain 
date. Presumably, under such analysis, if Mr. Moore were 
charged x percent of his premium for nonpayment on the 
due date, that due date would be deemed to have 
"require[d] . . . payment" for S 25 purposes, but if his 
penalty were some lesser percent, y, the due date would not 
have done so. Discerning what degree of financial burden 
would constitute a requirement under such a reading of 
S 25 would pose a formidable task for New York courts to 
undertake. Nothing in S 25's text, history, structure, or 
purpose appears to mandate that such delicate lines be 
drawn, however, and we further find no basis to conclude 
that such a task is implicit in the statute. 
 
Another possible interpretation of S 25 would demand 
only a de minimis financial penalty before a payment were 
deemed "require[d]." The necessity of some formal marker of 
the parties' intent--in the form of a de minimis penalty or 
otherwise--before invoking S 25 would seem curious, 
however, since S 25 itself seems intended tofill contractual 
"gaps," where contractual intent has not been clearly 
expressed. Also the text, history, structure, and purpose of 
S 25 provide no indication that such an anomalous result is 
statutorily necessary. 
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On the contrary, S 25's broad text--which seems to apply 
to all "require[d]" payments, not only to those whose default 
is financially penalized--is confirmed by the statute's 
general legislative purpose: protecting contracting parties 
from having to make payments on Sunday. A more urgent 
case for statutory protection would no doubt arise in cases 
where financial hardships followed from default, but we 
find no reason to believe that New York's statute was 
intended to apply only to such cases. Especially when the 
policy's terms are construed in the insured party's favor, 
Mr. Moore's contract with Guardian appears formally to 
have "require[d]" payment of his insurance premium on 
Sunday, August 4. And we find that New York law protects 
contracting parties from any "require[d]" payment on 
Sunday, even when no direct financial burden falls on 
those who fail to pay. 
 
C. Mr. Moore's Grace Period Began on Tuesday 
 
Having concluded that Mr. Moore could have paid his 
premium on Monday, August 5 without falling into default, 
the final task is to explain how this conclusion affects the 
policy's grace period. Guardian's policy provides for "a grace 
period of 31 days after the due date for premium 
payments," and it further defines the term"due date" as 
"the date of default." Since the "date of default," by the 
operation of S 25, did not occur until Monday, August 5, it 
is reasonable to construe the contractually-defined "due 
date" as also having moved to August 5. Hence, by the 
policy's terms, the thirty-one day grace period began on 
Tuesday, August 6, and Mr. Moore's life insurance coverage 
with Guardian had not yet lapsed on September 5, the day 
he died. 
 
For the foregoing reasons, the District Court's decision 
granting summary judgment to Guardian is reversed, and 
the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent 
with this opinion. 
 
A True Copy: 
Teste: 
 
       Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals 
       for the Third Circuit 
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